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Abstract. This paper aims to analyze the institutional development process of accountability 
institutions in Brazil. Scholars have identified an incremental development process of horizontal 
accountability institutions in Brazil, stimulating an important process in democracy. Our 
argument is that the incremental development process of accountability institutions was not 
followed by systemic developments able to encompass all accountability institutions. The reason 
for this is that, in spite of incremental advances, there has been no development regarding the 
procedural ecology of accountability institutions, thus hampering coordinated and cooperative 
actions between institutions. We analyzed the procedural flow from the Public Sweepstakes 
Program of the Comptroller General in Brazil as well as the performance of the institutions 
of the accountability system. We also conducted interviews with the leaders of accountability 
institutions in order to address the issue of cooperation and strategic coordination of the system 
of institutions.
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Resumen. Este artículo tiene como objetivo analizar el proceso de desarrollo institucional de 
las instituciones de rendición de cuentas en Brasil. Los académicos han identificado un proceso 
de desarrollo incremental de las instituciones de rendición de cuentas horizontal en Brasil, 
estimulando un proceso importante en la democracia. Nuestro argumento es que el proceso de 
desarrollo incremental de las instituciones de rendición de cuentas no fue seguido por desarrollos 
sistémicos capaces de abarcar todas las instituciones de rendición de cuentas. La razón de esto 
es que, a pesar de los avances incrementales, no ha habido desarrollo en cuanto a la ecología 
procesal de las instituciones de rendición de cuentas, lo que dificulta las acciones coordinadas y 
cooperativas entre las instituciones. Analizamos el flujo de procedimientos del Programa de Sorteos 
Públicos del Controladoría General en Brasil, así como el desempeño de las instituciones del 
sistema de rendición de cuentas. También realizamos entrevistas con los líderes de las instituciones 
de rendición de cuentas para abordar el tema de la cooperación y la coordinación estratégica del 
sistema de instituciones.
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1. Introduction
The democratization process in Brazil consolidated a political regime that ensures 
governability conditions on the one hand, and a process of institutional changes 
within the political system and public administration, on the other. These institution-
al changes have paved a new path for the development of a democratic governance 
for overcoming the particularisms that structure public administration. The 1988 
Constitution inaugurated a critical democratization process of the political system 
and triggered a gradual and incremental process of institutional development within 
public administration.
Accountability institutions assumed a prominent role in this institutional devel-
opment process, both in their internal change process as well as in their role in ad-
ministrative improvements and in establishing democratic governance. From a con-
text in which accountability institutions were absent in Brazil we moved on to a 
context of established and active institutions in tackling corruption and administra-
tive irregularities.
The main purpose of this article is to discuss this institutional development pro-
cess by focusing on the performance of control actions for irregularities practiced in 
Brazilian municipalities. The theoretical discussion revolves around the idea that 
there has been progress and development in accountability institutions. However, 
this development process has not engendered systemic developments in the ecology 
of accountability institutions. The implications of this issue lies in the fact that insti-
tutional development must be considered not only within internal organizational 
changes, but also in a systemic dimension, which considers the ecology of institu-
tions and the procedural flow. This procedural ecology entails an interaction pattern 
among institutions, explaining the broader systemic results regarding accountability. 
The article addressed the performance of Brazil’s system of accountability insti-
tutions, analyzing the flow of legal and administrative procedures against municipal 
administrators, covering the sequencing of accountability actions and the coordina-
tion and cooperation among institutions. In addition to this performance analysis, 
interviews with institutional leaders in the accountability system are conducted in 
order to understand the process of cooperation and coordination within the context 
of the systemic ecology of accountability institutions.
2. Theories of institutional change: incrementalism and development
The issue of institutional change has constituted a crucial element of political analy-
sis. Institutions play a primordial role in society and consequently they influence the 
Filgueiras, F. Cuadernos de Gobierno y Administración Pública 5-1 2018: 1-26 3
results of government actions and policies. Institutions represent the rules of the 
game and they may be formal or informal (Hall; Taylor, 2003). Understanding devel-
opment processes means understanding that the fundamental analytical problem in-
volved is how to constitute institutional causal mechanisms that can replace the ex-
ogenous factors associated to change (Rezende, 2010). In other words, explaining 
the process of political development means first gaining an understanding of the in-
stitutional mechanisms that trigger the change process and alter the rules and the 
distribution of power. Thus institutional change embraces controversy present in the 
specialized literature because there is no consensus as to change’s causal factors. 
Lindblon’s classic work states that incremental changes must be understood as 
being due to the rational nature of the decision making undertaken by political ac-
tors. The processes are incremental due to the high institutional costs associated to 
abrupt ruptures with the accumulated knowledge and with the institutions internal 
practices. In the same vein, institutional change is incremental because the context 
of change determines that small additional values will start to be added to the poli-
cies so that non incremental changes are, rationally, considered by the decision mak-
ers to be irrelevant or without any practical or contextual applicability (Lindblom, 
1959). That concept of incremental change does not mean that a policy is trans-
formed small step by small step. Institutional changes may take positive or negative 
directions whereby strategies can be reviewed in the course of their unfolding, or the 
context may impose defeats on the policy makers (Weiss; Woodhouse, 1992). The 
institutional changes occur in contexts of uncertainty, which means that the deci-
sion-making processes tend to try to transform policies by incremental amounts 
avoiding abrupt ruptures and with the aim of effectively achieving incremental 
changes in practices and results (Lindblom, 1959).
In Douglass North’s (1990) view, incremental change processes represent mar-
ginal adjustments to complex rules, norms and voluntary obedience structures with-
out which an institutional rupture would occur. Analyzing the institutional change 
process means understanding the catalyst of change whereby exogenous factors sig-
nify those mechanisms that trigger institutional change. Understanding those mech-
anisms is essential to any analysis of institutional change processes and results. 
Pierson (2004) further developed institutional change theories by focusing on the 
development process. According to that author, gaining an understanding of institu-
tional change would open up four analytical pathways, namely: (1) the theory of 
critical junctures, focusing on a development process; (2) theories that presuppose 
the existence of institutional malleability which is explained by the actions of the 
losing coalitions in the political process (3) the multidimensional aspects and the 
effects of interaction in the explanation of change, whereby those effects may be 
intentional or non-intentional; (4) the action of reformers, whereby, in the face of 
collective action problems, political agents prove themselves capable of undertaking 
reforms that generate change. Again, according to Pierson (2004), it is important to 
understand the institutional development process in an incremental way whereby the 
marginal gains emerge from the exogenous factors unleashed by events external to 
the institutions themselves.
If on the one hand, the explanation for institutional change processes lies with 
exogenous factors, on the other, it can also be explained by endogenous factors in 
which the causal elements of change stem from the behavior of the institutions’ in-
ternal agents in regard to the institutional forms and contexts (Mahoney; Thelen, 
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2010). The agents interpret the context in which they find themselves and act on it, 
modifying it and re-distributing power. The political conflict stems from the distribu-
tion and mobilization of resources and that generates the change process. In other 
words, it is important to understand the way in which the agents interpret the alloca-
tion of political resources and unleash, internally, the process of change directed at 
their institutions, whether it be an effort to maintain the status quo or one intended to 
provoke a rupture with it. That ambiguity and conflict regarding resource distribu-
tion generate a space for debate about the institutional rules. The greater the degree 
of ambiguity, the larger the space for contestation on the part of the agents will be, 
thereby creating a favorable context for endogenous change of the institutions. That 
does not come about merely from the institutions’ formal rules, because they are al-
ways open to a political interpretation space. The degree of formalization of the rules 
in force does not prevent the agents from adhering to them less and, by implication, 
does not prevent institutional change (Mahoney; Thelen, 2010). 
Those authors hold that institutions are not necessarily stable and are always sus-
ceptible to change. The agents act on the institutions internally to modify them so, in 
that case, the way the political context defines their strategies is important. Accord-
ing to Mahoney and Thelen, getting to understand the agents’ strategies requires an 
understanding of the following elements: (1) whether the powers of veto of those 
involved in the change process are strong or weak; (2) the degree of discretionary 
power agents enjoy in interpreting rules and procedures and applying them. On the 
basis of those two variables, discretionary powers and power of veto, it is possible, 
according to the same authors, to combine the political context with the institu-
tional forms. The relations between the two variables makes it possible to classify 
the institutional change strategies into four categories, namely (1) – displacement; 
(2) – layering; (3) – drift; and (4) – conversion (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010).
Thus the literature acknowledges that understanding institutional change involves 
understanding the exogenous and endogenous factors in the light of the formal and 
informal rules that regulate the institutions. In regard to exogenous factors, critical 
situations and political contexts are what matter in constituting change. As for the 
endogenous factors, the behaviors and strategies adopted by the agents inside the 
institutions are of vital importance in enabling an understanding of the institutional 
change process. In the level of analysis undertaken by Pierson (2004) and by Ma-
honey and Thelen (2010), understanding the process of institutional change is based 
on the relationship between agents and structures. On the other hand, such literature 
does not endeavor to understand institutions’ more systemic dynamics. 
Outside of the political context and the context of formal rules that delimit the 
relations between agents and institutional structures, we must also understand the 
interactions among institutions as being a systemic dynamic in which their relations 
are interdependent, which means that the change process leads to the formation of 
institutional coalitions. In other words, apart from analyzing the rules in the light of 
institutional ambiguity, agents’ strategies, critical junctures or political contexts that 
delineate change, it is also necessary to consider institutions interactions in the con-
text of a complex system of competencies and organizations in which situations of 
institutional conflict and cooperation make a difference in determining the result of 
change. The changes may encounter a vetoing situation or one of enforcement ac-
cording to the performance of other institutions and as a function of the relations of 
interdependence among the organizations.
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DiMaggio e Powell (1983) identified institutional definition, the process of struc-
turing institutions, as being marked by the following elements: (1) the extent of in-
teractions among organizations; (2) the emergence of domination and organizational 
coalitions; (3) an increase in the information load that organizations have to deal 
with; and (4) the development of mutual knowledge among the participants in the set 
of organizations involved in a joint venture. In other words, the institutional change 
process goes beyond the boundaries delimited by the organizations themselves and 
their respective competencies. The change can be interrupted or vetoed altogether, 
according to the interactions among the institutions and the impact of the institution-
al rules may be positive or negative, according to that institutional ecology.
Consequently, institutional incrementalism depends on two analytical keys: (1) 
the interaction between the agents and the institutional structures; and (2) the sys-
temic interaction among institutions. Systemic interaction among institutions, in 
the sense attributed to it by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), means the formation of 
an organizational cluster within the sphere of the State that involves mutual knowl-
edge concerning a common public venture undertaken by a set of institutions. The 
interactions can take the form of an organizational coalition whereby the institu-
tions come together around a common objective, or they may stem from institu-
tional competition that undermines the impact of the development process of each 
institution in the organizational cluster. Thus the development of the shared knowl-
edge and the control of information become essential to the constitution of organ-
izational clusters that imply either the solidification of the status quo which reduc-
es the impact of changes on an institution or the vetoing of any change at all 
(Galvin, 2012). Each institution is autonomous in its competences and functions 
but the result of its actions and of the change process depend on the interaction 
with other institutions. In that case interaction between political institutions and 
public administration takes place via fixed formal and informal processes that de-
limit a procedural ecology.
We take procedural ecology to be the interdependent relations of the institutions 
system whereby the actions carried out by one institution depend on the actions of 
other institutions. That interdependency is determined (fixed) by formal and infor-
mal rules and procedures that involve a set of institutions in a bid to achieve a certain 
end. Therefore, it is the process that fixes the ecology in such a way that result de-
pends on the institutions’ joint coordinated and cooperative action. An autonomous 
organization of the institutions intervenes in that process and it determines that the 
cooperation and coordination of the activities depend, on the one hand, on fixed in-
stitutional rules and competencies and on the other, on the establishment of political 
ties whereby the actors in the institutions understand that the cooperation and coor-
dination of activities are vital for the success of the actions undertaken by the system 
of institutions. The essential elements for a procedural ecology to function are the 
knowledge accumulated inside the institutions and the agents’ ability to control the 
information that results from their actions. The chart below displays the explanatory 
variables associated to institutional change.
We propose the hypothesis that the institutional change process, in addition to the 
interaction between the agents and the institution, depends on that procedural ecolo-
gy as its system dynamics whereby the interaction among institutions also matters. 
The latter interaction is formal because it is embedded in the institutions’ procedures, 
competencies and functions all directed at achieving a certain end. It is also informal, 
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insofar as it depends on determined knowledge shared by the institutions’ agents and 
on the processes of coordination and cooperation associated to the actions. In this 
case, the informal interactions depend on political conceptions, on the process of 
interpreting the rules and on the formation of organizational coalitions within the 
system of institutions. 
3. The development of accountability institutions in Brazil
We understand accountability to be the principle by which all public officials have 
the duty to be held publicly accountable for their actions so that society may not only 
evaluate the resource allocation, but also the actions and results accomplished by 
policies, programs, and actions proposed and implemented by governments. The 
concept of accountability refers to the set of procedures and processes circumscribed 
to modern State bureaucracies, such as internal and external control, through which 
the public may assess the value added by State policies to the public interest. As 
such, it is a fundamental principle for the legitimacy of the political system and for 
the actions of public administration, in addition to being a management tool for en-
suring the disclosure of government actions (Philp, 2009; Filgueiras, 2016).
This does not mean that the concept of accountability is a consensus among 
scholars. According to Mark Bovens, accountability is an evaluative concept and not 
an analytical concept, used to qualify a state of affairs or the performance of different 
actors while also referring to a set of practices that make evaluation possible. For 
Bovens, accountability comprises a kind of social relationship between an actor and 
a forum through which actors have an obligation to explain and justify their conduct. 
The forum, on the other hand, may pose questions and judge actors, who answer for 
the consequences of their actions. Thus, accountability responds to a cycle whereby 
actors must first inform the forum of their conduct regarding procedures, results, and 
Chart 1. The institutional change process.
Causal factor of 
institutional change
Analytical focus of 
the change process
Explanation for institutional 
change
Exogenous 
variables
Critical junctures, 
dependence on 
trajectory
Political and broader 
institutional situation 
Shocks external to the institutions 
that trigger institutional change
Endogenous 
variables
Factors associated 
to the distribution 
of resources among 
institutional agents
Organizational 
elements internal to 
the institutions
Organizational changes that lead 
to changes in the distributon of 
power among the agents and the 
resignification of institutional 
objectives and processes
Systemic 
variables
Interaction among 
the institutions of an 
organizational cluster
Procedural ecology Formation of organizational 
coalitions, control of information, 
institutional cooperation or 
conflict processes 
Source: elaborated by the author.
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actions. Secondly, the forum may interrogate the actor as to the adequacy of the pro-
vided information and the legitimacy and legality of the actor’s conduct. Third, the 
forum may condemn and impose sanctions to the actor. The process of accountabil-
ity means the actors’ duty to account for their actions, the justification and judgment 
of the actors’ conduct, and the possibility to sanction this conduct. Bovens therefore 
does not rule out sanctions as a crucial element of accountability (Bovens, 2007).
For O’Donnell (1999), accountability is a republican principle, crucial to the 
functioning of political institutions and of the State bureaucracy in order to ensure 
transparency and efficiency in the management of public resources and to avert mal-
functions. Stemming from a radical premise of separating the public and private di-
mensions, present in liberal and republican traditions, the basic premise is to ensure 
publicity in decisions and the implementation and evaluation of government actions 
for establishing an equalitarian political regime and public administration that is 
immune to unlawful practices. 
An institutional approach suggests that political association with different social 
contexts generate different potentials for accountability demands (Olsen, 2017). Ac-
countability demands is a element of accountability processes. The process involve 
rational arguing, deliberation, image-management and blame-games related to what 
has been done, what could have been done, whether what has been done is accepta-
ble; and also development and change of normative criteria for assessing behavior, 
explanations and justifications. The likelihood of accountability-demands depends 
on the institutional, social and behavioral bases of political order, all endogenous to 
democratic politics. In this sense, accountability process involves two types: (1) – 
accountability routines, that imply institutions and professional actor operating wi-
thin specialized structures to surveillance and control; (2) – accountability politics, 
that involves the public debate, deliberation and transformative perspective about 
the political order (Olsen, 2017). In the sense of this article, the focus is a accounta-
bility routines in the accountability process in Brazil. 
Institutions of the accountability system must be autonomous and acknowl-
edged by their operators as bearing public authority for supervising, controlling, 
correcting, and punishing illicit acts in view of preserving the public interest. 
Moreover, accountability requires a complex institutional network, according to 
complex competences for control, investigation, and punishment (Mainwaring, 
2003). Latin America in general and Brazil in particular, witnessed at the begin-
ning of the democratization process the absence of institutions for horizontal ac-
countability (O’Donnell, 1996, 25). The Brazilian democratization process meant 
the return of the basic conditions of polyarchy, in view of a transitional process 
that would come as a reaction to a crisis of the authoritarian regime implemented 
in 1964. The Constituent Assembly, at the height of the year 1987, faced the dilem-
ma of conducting choices for projecting an institutional planning able to efficient-
ly aggregate and process the growing pressure from an extremely heterogeneous 
and plural social environment (Abranches, 1988). The return of polyarchy condi-
tions promoted a political opening process essential for establishing democracy 
(Limongi, 2006). Parallel to the return of elections, an incremental development 
process of state institutions began, including horizontal accountability institutions. 
Political competition, political opposition, and clearer institutional rules have en-
couraged the development of horizontal accountability institutions (Melo, Pereira 
and Figueiredo, 2009).
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Political change in Brazil has led to an incremental development process in insti-
tutions. However, in face of a political regime that ensures governability conditions, 
there has been a cost in democratic governance conditions within the public sector, 
leading to an antagonism between the use of political authority on the one hand, and 
the use of public authority in administration, on the other. Moreover, these incremen-
tal changes in institutions within Brazil’s accountability system meant for a greater 
capacity to expose and publicize several corruption scandals, enabling junctures 
leading to rule changes, and strengthening the role of these institutions in society. 
That is, insofar that corruption in the public sector was being revealed, control and 
accountability mechanisms were strengthened (Taylor, Praça, 2014). From this pro-
cess we verify a growing spiral of institutional incrementalism, which aggregates 
new functions to accountability institutions (Filgueiras, 2013).
The 1988 Constitution established fixed competences to a set of institutions within 
a complex framework for controlling and supervising government powers. This insti-
tutional competency framework refers to a theoretical understanding where all repub-
lican powers must exercise the internal control of activities, and the Legislative Branch 
must exercise external control through the Federal Court of Accounts. Additionally, the 
Constitution delegated powers to the Public Prosecutor’s Office for controlling the 
public administration in addition to judicial and extrajudicial solutions1.
Through the 1988 Federal Constitution, the Federal Court of Accounts becomes 
responsible for the external control of public administration through oversight prac-
tices and for informing the National Congress on the correct exercise of powers 
delegated to public agents. The Federal Court of Accounts was created in 1891, be-
ing responsible for verifying the legality of the Executive Power’s accounts. Its name 
refers to it being an administrative court, whose primary aspect would the prescribed 
legality in the application of accounts. Since its creation in 1891, the court has gone 
through incremental changes. Over time, the Federal Court of Accounts has been 
expanding its scope, especially in 1967, when it was provided with the authority to 
conduct administrative audits. The Federal Court of Accounts left behind its strictly 
legalistic competences to assume competences pertaining to performance audits and 
public administration control (Speck, 2000). This led to a critical juncture for the 
Court, since it entailed changes in entrenched practices within its administration as 
well as the expansion of its functions. One other critical juncture, which represented 
a major change in the Federal Court of Accounts, was the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 
through which administrative and auditing practices were added and regulated, re-
quiring the institution to modernize its internal practices and to invest in technology 
(Loureiro, Teixeira, Cacique, 2009).
In the case of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the establishing of its competenc-
es through the 1988 Constitution also represented a critical juncture. The Federal 
1 The extrajudicial solution is a non-judicialized way of resolving conflicts. In Brazil, the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office is the agency responsible for suggesting legal solutions for conflict resolution. The Public Prosecutor’s 
Office is also responsible for suggesting recommendations and terms of conduct adjustment for the exercise of 
accountability and public administration control. A recommendation is nothing more than the instrument used 
by the Public Prosecutor’s Office to alert public officials about the need to resolve a given irregular situation or 
a situation that could lead to irregularity. The conduct adjustment agreement (TAC) is a legal instrument used to 
obtain from the tortfeasor, responsible for causing damage to diffuse and collective interests, an enforceable 
obligation of do’s and don’ts through which the tortfeasor assumes the duty to suit their conduct to legal requi-
rements, under penalty of sanctions laid down in the term itself.
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Constitution assured the functional and administrative autonomy of the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, making it further immune to political interests and more em-
powered to act in the public stage. Through functional autonomy, the Public Pros-
ecutor’s Office is responsible for exercising a justice function within the State, 
befalling upon it the defense of collective and diffuse social interests. It also be-
comes responsible for the defense of the democratic regime through the protection 
of public and social heritage. The Public Prosecutor’s Office is also responsible for 
a judicial function within the State, not limited to the defense of the State, moni-
toring, control, and punishment of administrative irregularities. Its competences 
are broader. For the purposes of this research, however, the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office is responsible for the crucial function of horizontal accountability due to its 
competences for supervision and judicial action against public officials and elected 
politicians (Arantes, 2011a).
The same happens with Federal Police. The Federal Police is the Union’s judicial 
police, responsible for investigating criminal offenses against public and social or-
der, against assets, services, and interests of the Union or of its autarchic entities and 
public companies, as well as other offenses with interstate or international conse-
quences that require uniform repression. The Federal Police was created in 1944 
near the end of the Estado Novo Regime as a Federal Department for Public Safety, 
but its functions were confined to the Federal District. In 1945, it gained national 
powers. Only with the 1988 Constitution were its competences fixed as the judicial 
police of the Union, recognized as a permanent body and with a career structure. The 
permanent nature of the Federal Police means that even when subordinated to the 
Executive Branch, the Federal Police cannot be dissolved by the government. In the 
second case, the structuring of the Federal Police in a career means rules for access 
to positions, a police hierarchy, and rules for career ascension and organizational 
subdivisions with defined competences. From this, the Federal Police board mem-
bers expanded over time, beyond the budgetary growth of the institution. The inter-
nal socialization of agents and police chiefs within the institution holds a strong re-
inforcement component of repressive actions against organized crime and corruption, 
alongside a strengthening of democracy (Arantes, 2011b).
Lastly, the creation of the Comptroller General of the Union in 2003 establishes 
a long incrementalism process for the internal control of Brazil’s public administra-
tion. Prior to the Comptroller General of the Union, the internal control system was 
decentralized across the several public management organs and coordinated by the 
Federal Internal Control Secretariat, under the Ministry of Finance (Olivieri, 2010). 
Law 10683/2003 founded the Comptroller General of the Union (CGU), which, with 
functional autonomy it took over and centralized every internal control activity of 
the Federal Government as well as initiatives for preventing and fighting corruption. 
The CGU represented an important innovation process in Brazil by not only central-
izing internal control activities and institutionalizing its practice within public ad-
ministration, but also for disseminating management and transparency practices. For 
Brazil, the CGU represents a process of functional conversion dictated by critical 
junctures of corruption scandals in the transition between the Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso administration to the Lula administration (Filgueiras e Araújo, 2014). The 
institutionalization of internal control allowed greater enforcement capacity, control, 
and monitoring of public policies in order to advance the accountability process 
(Balbe, 2013).
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The 1988 Constitution and the return of democracy in Brazil represented an es-
sential critical juncture, which triggered these incremental changes in accountability 
institutions. Firstly, by setting a complex and large chain of competences, rules, and 
processes at the institutional pinnacle. Secondly, because the 1988 Constitution led 
to changes in the organizational structure and practices within these institutions. 
Therefore, incremental changes were established from a context of empty horizontal 
accountability institutions in Brazil, which meant for the development of new public 
management practices and the gradual empowerment of accountability institutions. 
This resulted in the construction and development of a system of accountability in-
stitutions with unique and superimposed competences for prevention, investigation, 
and punishment of illicit acts within the political system and public administration. 
Corruption scandals served as catalysts in the change process, maintaining the incre-
mentalist development of accountability institutions (Taylor, Praça, 2014). 
The presence of these scandals in Brazil has placed corruption in the eye of the 
public opinion. There is something in common to all of these scandals. First of all, 
the massive media coverage publicizing corruption schemes and misuse of public 
funds. In Brazil, there is a pulsating and autonomous media to cover corruption 
cases, which play the role of watchdogs toward the political system (Porto, 2011). 
Secondly, all these corruption scandals are within a context of a social critique of 
politics, corroborating a widespread view that the Brazilian State is the natural 
space of vices. Third, all of these corruption scandals gave rise to ad hoc initiatives 
of public control, catalyzing an institutional change process in accountability insti-
tutions.
Institutional changes came in reaction to the critical junctures brought forth by 
corruption scandals. The reaction of the presidents was to promote anti-corruption 
initiatives and policies in the following areas: (1) – the dissemination of these poli-
cies due to the fact that Brazil had become a signatory to international conventions 
against corruption; (2) – the superposition of new organizational formats in public 
administration, as in the case of the creation of the Comptroller General of the Union 
and the greater autonomy of the Federal Police, leading to the coexistence of new 
and old institutional formats; (3) – the functional conversion of institutions, such as 
the Federal Court of Accounts, which were given further prerogatives and autonomy. 
This whole process of institutional change is grounded on a development process 
driving a path dependence situation, in which the route assumed by change involves 
gradual institutional strengthening (Pierson, 2004).
However, these changes did not result in broader systemic developments con-
cerning the interaction and complementarity processes that each institution holds 
with other institutions, in view of the procedural ecology of control actions and ac-
countability. Procedural ecology is an interdependent relationship within the system 
of institutions, where actions taken by an institution depends on the actions of other 
institutions. This interdependence happens within rules and procedures involving a 
set of institutions to carry out a goal. The process, therefore, places this ecology in 
such a way that the result depends on the joint, coordinated, and cooperative action 
of institutions. The system of accountability institutions has this procedural ecology 
set on certain rules and procedures involving a set of institutions to conduct the pur-
pose of control actions, in view of the activity sequencing defined in the process. 
This procedural ecology involves what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) called the 
institutional definition, which marks the institutional structuring process through the 
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following elements: (1) – the extent of interactions between organizations; (2) – the 
emergence of domination and organizational coalitions; (3) – an increase in the in-
formational load with which organizations must deal; (4) – the development of a 
mutual understanding among participants within the set of organizations with a com-
mon undertaking. In the system of accountability institutions in Brazil, however, the 
interaction process is marked by institutional interdependence, since institutional 
rules are superimposed and complementary. An increased interaction among institu-
tions of the accountability system does not result in cooperative or coordinated joint 
actions since organizations rationally struggle for recognition from the public opin-
ion. Procedural ecology, marked by the interdependent and complementary relation-
ship between institutions, implies in a relationship between processes and rules, on 
the one hand, and an institutional structure of cooperation and coordination by the 
actors, on the other.
Institutional change in Brazil was not accompanied by an ecological change in 
the system of accountability institutions, in which interactions among these institu-
tions is unable to produce coordinated and cooperative actions, thus failing to ensure 
a rational sequencing of activities destined to the improvement of accountability. 
Interactions between institutions of the accountability system in Brazil occurs proce-
durally in under-coordinated competences and processes, fueled by a political action 
guided by the critical junctures of corruption scandals.2 
4. Methodology and research focus
As previously stated, the main purpose of this article is to apprehend the perfor-
mance of accountability institutions in Brazil and the process of interaction between 
these institutions. To that end, we must therefore comprehend a control action imply-
ing and encompassing a set of institutions, in order to allow for an analysis of the 
procedural ecology of control actions in the system of accountability institutions. To 
evaluate this performance and comprehend the interaction between institutions, our 
chosen starting point is the control actions of the Public Sweepstakes Program of the 
Comptroller General of the Union (CGU).
The Public Sweepstakes Program was established in 2003 with the objective of 
promoting in loco auditing of federal public funds transferred to Brazilian munici-
palities. The Program is based on a random drawing of 60 municipalities per year, to 
which auditors are sent for an internal control by the CGU, which investigates the 
rendering of accounts, the financial allocation of resources, and public goods and 
services produced with these federal funds. The audit does limit itself to an assess-
ment of accounts, but also verifies the allocation of funds in order to assess whether 
the allocation of federal funds has reverted itself in goods and public services in the 
municipalities. The draws are randomized and based on the regional distribution of 
municipalities among states.
2 It is important to highlight that we do not address in this text the issue of societal accountability. In the case of 
Brazil, there is an instance of public control that occurs through the participation of society through public policy 
management councils. These councils extend to the municipal, state and federal levels and can exercise, through 
the participation of citizens, forms of control and inspection of public resources. Public policy councils are parti-
cipatory bodies, representing civil society and governments in the decision-making process on the application of 
resources and monitoring of accountability by governments. In this regard, see Avritzer (2012).
Filgueiras, F. Cuadernos de Gobierno y Administración Pública 5-1 2018: 1-2612
Our choice for the CGU Public Sweepstakes Program as our starting point has 
three reasons: (1) – the Public Sweepstakes Program allows us to extensively verify 
the actions of institutions of the accountability system insofar that it encompasses 
public policy managers and other institutions related to both the judicial prosecution 
of irregularities as well as non-judicial public control measures; (2) – the Public 
Sweepstakes Program allows us to verify a more generic set of irregularities, embez-
zlement, and signs of corruption in the public sector, as it deals with resource trans-
fers to federal entities and allows us to verify the dissemination of management flaws 
within the Brazilian public administration; (3) – the focus of the CGU Public Sweep-
stakes Program as a starting point permits us to verify the public administration 
control actions without interference from exogenous factors, such as the prospect of 
a political scandal. Since we are dealing with widespread irregularities in public 
administration, the Sweepstakes Program, through its reports, allows for a wider and 
more detailed verification of the quality of Brazil’s public administration.
Having made these considerations, we take the CGU Public Sweepstakes Pro-
gram as the starting point for our research. We have assembled a database with all the 
irregularities found in the audit reports from a sample of 322 municipalities, from a 
total 1800 randomly selected municipalities, between 2003 and 2010. The reason we 
chose this time interval is because of the problem posed in the research. Since the 
objective is to verify the actions of the set of institutions in the accountability system 
based on the information compiled from the audit reports, this time period was cho-
sen based on the deadlines for the other institutions to undertake investigative and 
punitive actions. Since the objective is to verify the performance of the system of 
accountability institutions and its internal interaction, this period is necessary so that 
each one may undertake the necessary formal actions for investigating and punishing 
irregularities. The sample was comprised of 322 municipalities, and stratified by 
region, state, and draw number, in order to meet a more balanced distribution among 
municipalities already audited by the Public Sweepstakes Program. The randomly 
selected municipalities have up to 500 thousand inhabitants, excluding state capitals. 
From this data for the sample of municipalities, we traced the processes in the other 
institutions originating in the Public Sweepstakes Program.
With this procedure, we established a database allowing us to verify the flow of 
all processes involving administrative, judicial, and extrajudicial procedures, ac-
cording to the competences of each institution. The data allows us to verify the per-
formance of the system of institutions regarding public control processes and the 
interaction between them, stemming from the premise that public control actions 
involve a complex procedural ecology, with specific competences, ranging from in-
vestigative actions to punishing irregularities, embezzlement practices, and corrup-
tion. Our analytical unit consists of each of the irregularities found in the Public 
Sweepstakes Program reports within the sample.
To verify the interaction that these institutions of the accountability system have 
among themselves, the survey also performed a qualitative approach. We conducted 
interviews with leaders of the Comptroller General of the Union, the Federal Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, the Federal Court of Accounts, the Federal Police, and the Fed-
eral Court, which deal directly with public administration control actions and actions 
against corruption. The purpose of these interviews is to establish an explanation for 
the performance issues raised in the quantitative approach, stemming from the hy-
pothesis that such poor performance is due to problems in the procedural ecology of 
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the institutions within the Brazilian accountability system. The interviews with lead-
ers of these institutions allow us to assemble the puzzle of power relations and polit-
ical disputes occurring within Brazil’s accountability system.
Sixty-three interviews were done in total. Interviews were conducted with 18 
leaders of the Comptroller General, 15 leaders of the Federal Court of Accounts, and 
14 leaders of the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office between June 2 and June 6, 
2014. The interviews with 10 Federal Police superintendents and commissioners and 
6 Federal Court judges were conducted between 25 and 27 February, 2015.
From the qualitative data collected through interviews, we conducted an analysis 
of the interaction between accountability institutions. The motivation behind this 
analysis is to understand how these institutions interact and to find an explanation for 
the performance results obtained from the control actions motivated by the Public 
Sweepstakes Program.
5.  The procedural flow of accountability institutions in Brazil
An analysis of the audit reports of the CGU Public Sweepstakes Program allows us 
to understand the quality of municipal governments in Brazil and the actions of the 
institutions in the accountability system (Rothstein, 2011; La Porta, et al, 1999). 
From a substantial point of view, it allows us to analyze the capacity by which public 
policies are implemented at the municipal level in Brazil to improve the quality of 
life of citizens. Since we are dealing here with the allocation of federal resources in 
the municipalities, with the prerogative of improving development conditions, the 
analysis of the reports provides an accurate picture of the quality of municipal gov-
ernments and the implementation of public policies. The assumption is that munici-
palities are Union partners in the implementation of public policies, in view of a 
substantial aspect of promoting economic, political, and social development, associ-
ated with strict procedures under Brazilian law for the decentralization of public re-
sources within the Federation.
The municipalities comprising the sample have specific characteristics. In gener-
al, they are small municipalities, with a moderate human development index and 
heavily dependent on the transfer of resources from the Union. According to the data 
in Table 1 below, on average, 44.10% of the budget of the municipalities in the sam-
ple comes from funds transferred by the Union. The mean population in the sample 
is 26,720.8 inhabitants, with an average illiteracy rate of 23.0%, and an average ur-
banization rate of 57.44%. These are generally poor municipalities, with an average 
poverty rate of 45.48% and an average GDP of R$198807.26. On average, 62% of 
the active employees in the municipality’s direct administration are statutory, with 
stability. With these characteristics, the municipalities are dependent upon the Union 
for the development of public policies and lack sufficient infrastructure for adminis-
trative autonomy and government quality. The dependency ratio is high, making 
these municipalities liable to minor and major corruption practices.
In the audit reports of the Public Sweepstakes Program, for the sample of 322 
municipalities used in this research, we found irregularities in 19153 municipalities. 
These irregularities range from small procedural flaws to serious evidence of corrup-
tion practiced at the municipal level. We proceeded to classify the 19153 of irregu-
larities found in the audit reports of the CGU Public Sweepstakes Program in order 
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to identify the sector or nature of the found irregularity. Table 2 below shows the 
classification of such irregularities.
From a total of 19153 irregularities found, the majority are in the financial sec-
tor and in the municipalities’ available infrastructure. The bulk of these irregulari-
ties concerns procedural flaws in view of non-compliance with the rules of govern-
ment programs as well as with the general rules of resource decentralization. 
Irregularities on public policy councils relate to the certain obligations of munici-
palities regarding the establishment of participation councils for monitoring re-
source allocation. In the audit reports, the meeting minutes are checked as well as 
the rules for its creation, and the regularity of meetings. Irregularities in public 
procurements concern problems in Law 8.666, which sets public procurement pro-
Table 1. Descriptive data of the sample’s municipalities 
Index N Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation
Variance
Population size 322 795 363392 26720,8 46515,9 2,164
MHDI 322 0,272 0,813 0,546 0,114 0,013
Gross domestic 
product in current 
prices (R$)
322 6853,00 4771863,00 198807,26 460293,47 2,119
Illiteracy rate (%) 322 1,90 65,5 23,0 12,25 150,15
Urbanization rate 322 4,18 100,0 57,44 21,80 475,30
Poverty incidence 322 11,05 84,00 45,48 14,82 219,90
Number of active 
employees in direct 
administration
322 19 6568 850,87 985,76 971724,91
Amount of active 
statutory employees in 
direct administration 
322 0 4161 529,07 699,96 489495,56
Resources transferred 
from the Union to the 
municipality in the 
draw year (R$)
322 11983,45 181513291,40 12320358,15 19471356,33 3,791E14
Municipal revenue in 
the draw year (R$)
322 53610,72 338287868,70 27933871,42 52674274,76 2,775E15
Ratio between 
income and resources 
transferred from the 
Union in the draw 
year 
322 22,35% 53,65% 44,10% - -
Sources: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, Basic Municipal Information Survey; PNUD – Municipal 
Human Development Index – Brazil.
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cedures and publicity rules for public tenders, as well as rules for purchasing and 
hiring within the public sector. Irregularities in transparency issues concern pub-
licity problems in public acts conducted by the sampled municipalities. Problems 
in construction relate to unfinished constructions, performed with inappropriate 
material, unperformed constructions, and works not in compliance with the re-
quirements for the construction of public applications. Infrastructure problems 
concern the physical infrastructure and personnel available in municipalities for 
the implementation of programs and partnerships. Administrative irregularities re-
fer to the municipalities’ organizational issues, such as the existence of master 
plans and the organization in programs and partnerships. Faults in other organs 
concerns irregularities in which the execution of programs and partnerships does 
not depend solely on the audited municipality, but on other organs, such as the 
State or the Union itself. Irregularities referring to the target audience concern the 
correct application and destination of public funds to the target audience for pro-
grams and partnerships established with municipalities. Resources from the Bolsa 
Familia Program are one example, which should be forwarded directly to benefi-
ciaries and municipalities should not receive shared remuneration over decentral-
ized resources. Lastly, we have irregularities concerning registration, which refer 
to problems found in public records and information management, where privileg-
es or misapplication of public funds are concerned.
Table 2. Classification of administrative irregularities 
Type of administrative irregularity Frequency Percentage Valid 
percentage
Cumulative 
percentage
Irregularities in public policy councils 1162 6,1 6,1 6,1
Irregularities in public procurements 3181 16,6 16,7 22,8
Irregularities concerning transparency 
problems
1242 6,5 6,5 29,3
Irregularities in public construction 1070 5,6 5,6 34,9
Irregularities in infrastructure 3600 18,8 18,9 53,7
Financial irregularities 4587 23,9 24,0 77,7
Administrative irregularities 925 4,8 4,8 82,6
Faults in other organs 407 2,1 2,1 84,7
Irregularities concerning the target 
audience
1541 8,0 8,1 92,8
Irregularities concerning registration 1375 7,2 7,2 100,0
Not applicable* 63 0,3 - -
Total 19153 100,0 100,0 -
* Not applicable relates to irregularities not regularly described in the reports, preventing their classification.
Source: Public Sweepstakes Program – Comptroller General of the Union, 2003-2010.
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Brazil’s public administration control is conducted through administrative and 
criminal procedures, which not only focus on correcting the use of public resourc-
es, but also on correcting the public administration principles in Article 37 of the 
Constitution, especially regarding legality, impartiality, efficiency, economic effi-
ciency, and publicity. The effective exercise of probity control in relation to these 
principles, therefore, calls for the complex workings of a procedural ecology, rang-
ing from accountability to judicial prosecution processes. Thus, a system of ac-
countability institutions demands that these institutions work in the context of a 
complex web of procedures, obeying the following principles, as defined by Doig 
and McIvor (2003):
 
• Time control and strategic intervention;
• Establishing priorities for action;
• Coordination;
• Cooperation;
• Sequencing.
In spite of the efforts in establishing strategic actions and the efforts to coordi-
nate the activities of the institution, the results revealed by an analysis of the Pub-
lic Sweepstakes Program are well below expectations. The interaction between 
institutions conducting auditing and resource decentralization control for Brazilian 
municipalities and the criminal and administrative prosecution process, as well as 
the extrajudicial solutions, are below expectations. Figure 1 summarizes the re-
sults of the ecological flow of processes among institutions of the accountability 
system, revealing the gradual evanescence of control as the procedural flow ad-
vances forward.
Figure 1 shows the percentage of irregularities found in the Public Sweepstakes 
Program communicated to the other institutions within the accountability system. 
From a set of 100% of irregularities presented in the Public Sweepstakes Program 
audit reports, 49.6% were analyzed by the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office, 
32.35% of these irregularities were finalized in the Federal Public Prosecutor’s 
Office, and 10.5% of them were archived. Only 0.93% of these irregularities were 
inferred in Federal Police investigations and only 1.28% of these irregularities 
were analyzed in the Federal Court of Accounts. Under the Federal Court, only 
4.25% of these irregularities suffered lawsuits, with only 1.64% of all irregularities 
being sentenced in the first instance of the Federal Court. From this set of irregu-
larities raised in the Public Sweepstakes Program (19153 irregularities), only 
1.27% of them resulted in convictions of public administrator responsible for allo-
cating federal funds.
By considering the irregularities found in the sample, we may realize that a fair 
portion of them were not even analyzed or considered by other institutions. In oth-
er words, many of the control actions are lost or disregarded in the procedural flow. 
We have raised the hypothesis that poor performance happens because, in spite of 
the efforts to coordinate the activities of the institutions of the accountability sys-
tem and the establishment of goals, inter-institutional cooperation is low for public 
administration control. When observing figure 1, we see a very low performance 
of joint administrative and criminal actions, being a result of the interdependence 
of processes in the ecological matrix of accountability institutions. By observing 
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the actions of the institutions in the Brazilian accountability system, we notice that 
institutions filter the referrals from the Comptroller General, leading to a feeble 
process in the liability and punishment of irregularities within the municipalities’ 
administration.
Underperformance also occurs if we change the analytical unit of the municipal-
ities. In the context of the sample, only 175 municipalities had their report analysis 
finalized by the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office. Only 13 municipalities were the 
subject of a police inquiry in the Federal Police. 32 municipalities had their admin-
istrators convicted in the Federal Court of Accounts of the Union and 20 administra-
tors were convicted in the Federal Court, as shown in Figure 2. We should underline 
that no recommendation or conduct adjustment agreement was found for the sam-
pled municipalities.
Poor performance originates from the low cooperation between institutions of 
the accountability system. However, this happens not when establishing objec-
tives or in the decision-making process concerning the priorities of institutional 
action, but in the day-to-day control on public administration and the ecological 
flow surrounding administrative, judicial, and extrajudicial procedures. The next 
section analyzes the interaction between institutions in Brazil’s accountability 
system.
Figure 1. Quantitative performance of administrative and judicial procedures informed by 
the public sweepstakes program analytical unit: Irregularities.
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6.  Results: Interactions among institutions in the brazilian accountability 
system
The questions raised in the previous sections allows us to establish a diagnosis based 
on the flow of processes in irregularity control actions regarding the public adminis-
tration of Brazilian municipalities. From the above charts and graphs, we may con-
clude that a number of control measures are lost in the procedural flow, which re-
quires specific actions from each of the institutions involved as well as coordinated 
actions from the institutions of the accountability system. In other words, hypotheti-
cally, we may affirm that from the information gathered on municipal public admin-
istration in Brazil, within our sample, the result is ineffective regarding the account-
ability of public officials.
The analytical procedure of interviews with leaders of accountability institutions 
sought to understand two sets of questions: (1) – an understanding of the institution-
alization of the accountability system in Brazil; (2) – the cooperation, coordination, 
and definition of strategic priorities within the system of accountability institutions.
6.1. The structure of accountability institutions
Notwithstanding the constitutional competences of these institutions, the daily work 
performed within them – by employees assigned to complex tasks pertaining to in-
ternal control, external control, investigation, and judicial and extrajudicial solutions 
– allows us to identify an ethos that is unique to these institutions. Through available 
research tools, we were able to find that institutions of the Brazilian accountability 
system have their own conception of the management mechanisms, articulating an 
almost existential conception for defining their role within the Brazilian state in gen-
eral and in the context of public administration in particular.
This ethos shapes these institutions as an insulated place within the Brazilian 
State, consisting of very skilled public employees, with solid technical knowledge 
and focused on functions determined in regulatory arrangements (Nunes, 1997). 
This scenario can be found in all analyzed institutions, in which their insulation to-
ward clientelism and corporatism mechanisms establishes a kind of immunity to 
more immediate political interests. In general, actors in these institutions are highly 
Graph 2. Quantitative performance of administrative and judicial procedures informed by 
the Public Sweepstakes Program Analytical unit: Number of municipalities.
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qualified individuals, appointed through public tender for performing tasks within 
the bureaucracy. However, one issue calls our attention in several discourses from 
the respondents: their distance from party politics, criticisms toward the Legislative 
Power, and criticism toward politics. 
This critique toward politics and representation resonated constantly across all in-
terviews. Therefore, through the interviews were able to detect that the configuration 
of the professional ethos of these institutions seeks to oppose any form of intervention 
from political interests and representation. Institutional leaders and professionals see 
themselves as watchmen, opposed to political representation, and consider their main 
role to be the establishment of some type of control over public management, both in 
regard to formal irregularities and corruption within the Brazilian State. The leaders of 
these institutions indicate a position of counter-democracy. According to Rosanval-
lon’s argument, counter-democracy is the emergence of a surveillance power, the mul-
tiplication of powers, and a growing judicialization of politics in view of a growing 
distrust in democratic societies (Rosanvallon, 2006). 
The central role played by these institutions within the public administration sce-
nario in Brazil is to tackle any form of irregularity in the use of public resources and 
in the control of public policies. It is important to stress that we did not find among 
the interviewed leaders a concern with the results of State actions within society, but 
rather, above all, with the formal and legal control in the application and implemen-
tation of public policies. Such a surveillance role from these institutions, as men-
tioned in different interviews, pertains to the control of public administration in op-
position to political actions in view of heavily institutionalized public action 
mechanisms. This institutionalization process of institutions of the accountability 
system creates deep conflicts with the political system, making it so the process of 
institutional change often becomes a process of coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio 
and Powel, 1983, 150).
One must remember that the institutionalization of these institutions of the ac-
countability system respects their procedural and formal conception, in which com-
petences are fixed and clear to their leaders, ensuring, as indicated by the interviews, 
that there exists a strong autonomy for action by these institutions within the State. 
However, one important finding of this research regarding competences calls our 
attention. Institutions have strongly institutionalized competences and act exclusive-
ly within them. In a way, the institutionalization of these competences promotes a 
technical and defined work within each institution, in a way that the process becomes 
determinant to the success of control and surveillance actions within the State. 
Therefore, strong institutionalization does not establish a gray area in the agency of 
these accountability institutions, and we find a well-defined process in place. The 
problem we detected from the interviews is that there is no motivation for joint and 
coordinated actions, and therefore, in addition to the insulation and criticisms toward 
institutions for political representation, insulation also exists toward all institutions 
of the accountability system. By besieging themselves solely around their compe-
tences, this leads to a mechanism providing little incentives for cooperative and co-
ordinated actions, and thus the institutional conflict occurs both in the external di-
mension of the accountability system, where it clashes with the political system, as 
well as the internal dimension, where institutions are in conflict among themselves.
This becomes blatant when respondents were asked about the trade-off between 
corruption and development. Corruption involves high transaction costs in the public 
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service. The economic costs of corruption represent consequences to the reduction of 
incentives for productive investment, since corruption is seen as yet another fee that 
needs to be paid off, thus reducing the profitability of projects (Shleifer, Vishny, 1993). 
Lastly, corruption reduces the effectiveness of resources distributed through the public 
sector, thus also representing a high cost of social injustice (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
On the other hand, tackling corruption entails high expenditures with control in-
stitutions and bureaucracy, leading to an expansion of bureaucratic processes, licens-
es, permits, and formal procedures for conducting public services and productive 
activities. Just as corruption involves high transaction costs, and hampers the busi-
ness environment, the activities of the bureaucracy against corruption also affect 
development due to the high costs of unproductive activities (Leff, 1964). Further-
more, the expansion of the bureaucratic control of corruption generates negative ef-
fects within the State, establishing bureaucracies that are refractory to any innova-
tion or business, fearing they will fall into the mass grave of corruption. Therefore, 
control of corruption would also represent a high cost for development, and quite 
often an insurmountable barrier (Anechiarico, Jacobs, 1996).
Interviewees positioned themselves wholly against the trade-off between corrup-
tion and development, and considered it a fallacy. This position was quite clear 
among all respondents. While respondents recognize that an increase in the inherent 
bureaucracy with increased public control of corruption leads to development costs, 
they refuted this trade-off, presenting the fight against corruption as a constitutive 
element of the institutionalization process of institutions of the accountability sys-
tem. On the other hand, the political system perceives the role of these institutions as 
inappropriate and heavily marked by political persecution.
Within this context, operators from different institutions of the accountability 
system, with clear and institutionalized competences, play a surveillance role in pub-
lic administration, asserting their role as counter-majoritarian institutions, i.e., with-
out political or party ties, strongly autonomous in relation to social pressures, and 
with a high degree of discretionary actions within Brazilian public administration. In 
the context of these institutions, their leaders incorporate control actions toward the 
formal means of public administration, without further concerns as to the achieved 
social benefits and results. According to its leaders, these institutions should be able 
to anticipate political institutions and establish increased surveillance mechanisms 
within democracies against representation.
6.2. Institutional cooperation, coordination, and defining strategic priorities
Institutional cooperation and coordination must be understood as a crucial element 
for public administration control and for tackling corruption. Firstly, we should not 
consider each institution in isolation or self-sufficiently within a complex institu-
tional context. There exists subsidiary relations and complementarities between 
institutions, where actions from one institution are complemented by actions from 
others, bearing in mind that procedural ecology must be solid and consistent. 
Therefore, it makes more sense to address the issue of coordination and coopera-
tion among institutions as the formulation and performance of the system of ac-
countability institutions. Institutional cooperation and coordination are essential 
for the proper functioning of the institutional system. This systemic and procedur-
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al consistency, when broken, explains the poor performance of the system of ac-
countability institutions.
What particularly called our attention in the interviewees’ accounts on this sub-
ject is that tackling management irregularities promotes an institutional dispute. As-
suming that corruption scandals generate public attention toward public administra-
tion and politics, fighting corruption and activating accountability institutions 
promotes the formation of a critical juncture. Within this juncture, the work ends up 
being focused on seeking results for the institution assuming the leading role. To be 
a protagonist in the fight against corruption in the public sphere generates interest 
from the public opinion. As mentioned by one of the interviewees:
Most respondents were emphatic in stating that there are difficulties in institu-
tional cooperation. Political dispute between institutions means that there is little 
cooperation, especially when it comes to tasks that require coordination and prompt-
ness. The low effectiveness in institutional cooperation within this system of institu-
tions does not occur, therefore, through a normative vacuum. Respondents were cat-
egorical in stating that cooperation agreements exist and they increase interaction 
between institutions. However, even though the performance of these institutions 
must be systemic, the political dispute context ultimately compromises joint and 
coordinated actions, placing the issue of institutional change mostly centered in the 
procedural ecology than in the isomorphism process of the institutions.
The second factor hampering institutional cooperation stressed by respondents 
pertains to the lack of a common procedure or evaluation and auditing standards 
among institutions. For example, respondents cited the lack of measurement and 
evaluation standards for construction works. Since institutions adopt different stand-
ards for their engineering staff, there lacks a common investigation, which results in 
huge amounts of repeated works, process delays, and evaluative differences.
Thirdly and resulting from the second factor, a procedural inconsistency exists 
among institutions, especially in disagreements as to the procedures and norms for 
auditing procedures and civil and criminal prosecutions. This inconsistency occurs due 
to differing interpretations concerning procedures and public service standards, result-
ing in inconsistency regarding the necessary normative terms for the workings of ac-
countability institutions. Many respondents reported a dispute among institutions when 
it comes to interpreting the law, leading to delays and reworks in processes. 
As noted by the interviewees, cooperative efforts do exist. However, the political 
dispute among institutions ultimately hampers a more systemic composition of the 
institutions. The presence of the Control Network, according to the interviewees, 
was an important institutional progress3. However, dispute still exists among institu-
tions, even if cooperation agreements have been signed. Competence complementa-
rity requires that institutions uphold dialogue and information exchange. However, 
as some respondents said, information exchange is still a feeble element as there is 
no coordinated information sharing among accountability institutions. The result is 
that this institutional change process in accountability institutions produced specific 
3 The Control Network is an inter-organizational decision-making center for improving the effectiveness of State 
control over public administration. From 2009, the Public Administration Control Network began to be imple-
mented through workshops in Brasilia and the employment of networks within the states. The main objective 
of the Control Network is to develop actions for public management monitoring, diagnosing and tackling co-
rruption, encouragement and strengthening of social control, the sharing of information and documents, exchan-
ge of experience, and staff training.
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incremental changes, without altering procedural ecology due to an explicit conflict 
among institutions of the accountability system.
Respondents were unanimous in stating the need for information sharing and the 
creation of a joint intelligence system as a key element in the development of the 
system of accountability institutions. This element, according to some respondents, 
would provide greater institutional cooperation, but would demand a reform ad-
dressing the issue of secrecy, especially banking and tax secrecy, which could pro-
vide greater power to this intelligence system. According to the interviewees, the 
issue of shared information has become a key element for cooperation within this 
institutional control system.
However, we found in the interviews that on top of cooperation issue, which 
has been underway even if with difficulties in the institutional system, there also 
exists a coordination problem. Some respondents stated that while there has been 
an effort by the National Strategy for Fighting Corruption and Money Laundering 
(ENCCLA), coordination problems still persist. According to the interviewees, the 
ENCCLA offers an important forum for exchanging experiences and expertise. 
The ENCCLA is a forum for creating common strategies to the system of institu-
tions, but struggles with the authoritative coordination of actions within this sys-
tem of institutions. Respondents reported that ENCCLA is successful in formulat-
ing strategic objectives, grounded in joint studies and in debating common 
problems. As stated by the respondents, legislative innovations were produced 
within the ENCCLA as well as the discussion of several issues common to the 
system of accountability institutions4.
Respondents reported that the interaction between institutions and the coordinat-
ed integration of actions are crucial to the workings of the system. However, the 
coordination issue is transversed by the information problem. According to some 
respondents, the intensity of the interaction among institutions of the system of ac-
countability decreases insofar that institutional dispute prevails not only within the 
political field, but also in the production and processing of information. Most re-
spondents acknowledged the need for information sharing. However, they also ac-
knowledge that information is an element of power. 
In this assertion, information dispute establishes difficulties when it comes to 
coordinating the activities of the system of accountability institutions. Moreover, 
contrary to what the respondents stated as being the difficulties toward politics, they 
realize that an institutional control of public administration cannot abstain from be-
ing inserted within power relations. Information empowers institutions of the ac-
countability system, rendering their actions to become political, beyond the scope of 
administrative procedures. The ENCCLA plays a primary role in being a forum for 
the deliberation of strategic priorities. However, according to the respondents, the 
4 The National Strategy for Fighting Corruption and Money Laundering is an initiative of the Federal Ministry of 
Justice, representing a debate forum for creating strategies for fighting corruption and money laundering in 
Brazil. The ENCCLA brings together circa 60 agencies directly or indirectly involved in fighting corruption. It 
is organized by an annual Plenary Meeting, which brings together all agencies, in order to discuss the work 
conducted over the year and to decide on actions for the following year; several Workgroup meetings, formed 
by participating or guest agencies, with the objective of conducing the Plenary’s deliberative actions; and bi-
monthly meetings of the Integrated Administration Office - IAO, which consists of a group of 25 ENCCLA 
participating agencies with the objective of monitoring the implementation of actions, and to suggest actions 
and recommendations to be discussed in the Plenary Meetings.
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ENCCLA has not yet been able to take on the coordination of the system of account-
ability institutions, and thus the lack of coordination hinders any institutional coop-
eration. Instead, we find political disputes among institutions embedded with the 
responsibility of controlling public administration and fighting corruption. 
Within this context, one of the main findings explaining the occurrence of proce-
dural inconsistency within the system of accountability institutions lies in the fact 
that a political dispute exists, motivated by public opinion. Corruption and adminis-
trative irregularities leads to public attention, which in turn leads to an intense dis-
pute among institutions seeking recognition and therefore, a substantial symbolic 
power. This symbolic power is responsible for introducing a procedural inconsisten-
cy within the system of accountability institutions, through which by knowing that 
competences are complementary, no activity sequencing occurs nor the necessary 
attention is given to elements traversing the interaction among institutions.
As reported by respondents, despite the efforts in institutional coordination and 
cooperation, there is little coordinated effort capable of ensuring the full develop-
ment of the institutions in the accountability system. The creation of incentives for 
coordination is vital for establishing cooperation, even in a context of dispute for 
symbolic power. In this case, the process of institutional change collides with the 
issue of activity sequencing in such a way that, despite the information raised in the 
Sweepstakes Program, the ineffective cooperation of institutions of the accountabil-
ity system hampers the necessary continuity of control actions and the fight against 
administrative irregularities and corruption. Without common efforts from institu-
tions of the accountability system, there will be little progress in tackling the govern-
ment’s quality problems and corruption.
7. Final remarks
The Brazilian case shows that an analysis of the institutional development process 
must address not only an internal approach on institutions, but also attend to a broad-
er process encompassing systemic changes in the institutional ecology. Without an 
understanding of this ecology of institutions, based on their procedural flow and the 
strategic behavior of actors, it becomes impossible to fully comprehend the perfor-
mance of the institutional system.
Regarding the case study of accountability institutions in Brazil, evidence shows 
that procedural ecology manifests itself as a sense of competition among the system-
ic elements, i.e. among the institutions of the accountability system. The conflict 
logic is the fact that institutions compete for the procedures of other elements of the 
system and do not respond to demands that are internal to the system itself. In this 
case, the concept of procedural ecology leads us to the fact that the interaction be-
tween the accountability system elements causes the closing of each institution in its 
own operational base. 
Although there is common knowledge among the staff about the necessity of 
cooperation and institutional coordination, the result indicated by the evidence de-
scribed above directs the analysis to the fact that there is a dispute over control pro-
cedures and instrumental use of the information created, without there being any 
interaction process grounded in open exchanges and robust procedures to ensure the 
fluidity of those systemic exchanges.
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The result is therefore that the process of institutional change collides with sys-
temic processes changes, whereby inside the system of accountability of institutions 
in Brazil there is a strong process of differentiation between institutions, on the one 
hand, without any opening of symbiotic exchanges of processes and information, on 
the other. It follows that the procedural ecology of the system of accountability insti-
tutions in Brazil did not advance the systemic variables change and so the conflict 
between the institutions undermines their interdependence, complementariness, se-
quencing of actions and the fluidity of the set of institutions that compete for percep-
tions external to the system itself.
The systemic dimension is jeopardized because there have been no changes in the 
procedural ecology of institutions, creating a dispute scenario for procedures and 
political conflict among institutions and affecting, in turn, the entire set of results. In 
that sense, the systemic dimension of institutional change is critical in determining 
the change process as well as its directions.
The variables of the process of institutional change need be considered, in which 
the interactions between institutions matter not only for the results, but also for inter-
nal processes, rules and organizational routines inherent to the institutions. Thus, 
understanding the systemic factors of institutional development involves consider-
ing the following factors, in the light of the procedural ecology concept: (1) – the 
flow and sequencing of processes internal to the system; (2) – the stances of the 
agents in regard to the institutional interactions; (3) – the establishment of joint or-
ganizational goals for the system; (4) – the control and use of information by the 
system elements; (5) – the response to internal situations and demands on the part of 
each of the elements that make up the system; (6) – the response to external situa-
tions and demands on the part of each of the elements that make up the system.
Considering these analytical factors, the process of change can be understood in 
terms of the interdependence of institutions, when appropriate, and how those factors 
affect the institutional development process, favoring either change or the status quo. 
Systemic variables thus influence institutional incrementalism, so that the agents still 
prefer incremental changes in routines and processes for their institutions in response 
to endogenous and exogenous environmental factors. However, this incrementalism 
may result either in a differentiation and greater closing of each of the system elements, 
favoring institutional conflict, or in an incremental process that is capable, by means of 
cooperation and coordination of system elements, of driving the process of interde-
pendence, overlapping and complementary institutions. In the latter case, the agents 
act within systemic structures that promote or inhibit the conflict of institutions, re-
sponding to this by producing increments of rules and organizational routines that re-
sult in conditions for greater closure or greater opening of the organizations. The direc-
tion of these incremental changes in the system matters for the result is because it sets 
the change of trajectory and patterns of interaction between system elements. 
Particularly concerning the system of accountability institutions in Brazil, the 
institutional development of each institution is verifiable. However, this develop-
ment process did not lead to systemic changes in the ecology of institutions in such 
a way to create incentives for institutional cooperation, for the coordination of activ-
ities, and for the sequencing of activities within the procedural flow. Likewise, the 
institutional development process did not lead to reasons to extinguish and to control 
the political conflict within the system of accountability institutions. The political 
conflict surrounding Brazil’s institutions of the accountability system paralyzes the 
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sequencing of activities and establishes a scenario of political struggles for public 
opinion. 
Poor performance, as in the case of the Public Sweepstakes Program, reveals an 
institutional ecology grounded on political dispute and the uncooperative nature of 
the accountability institutions, producing a much lower than expected and less effec-
tive performance regarding the relational accountability process. In spite of the de-
velopment process of accountability institutions, systemic ecology and procedural 
flow reproduce a scenario of accountability deficit.
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